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Rapporteur's Preface
In preparation for this report, the Rapporteur met or received evidence from the following:
Washington DC 
- 
5th to 8th February l99l
State Department
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs;
Mr. Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs;
Mrs. Avis Bohlen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairsl
Mr. Michael Moodie. Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs, Arms Control and Disarm-
ament Agency.
I'lational Security Council
Mr. David Gompert, Senior Director for Soviet and European Affairs.
The Pentagon
Mr. Henry Rowen. Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs;
Mr. Bruce Weinrod, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy;
Lieutenant General Edward Loland, Director, Strategic Planning Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The committee as a whole was briefed as follows:
Paris 
- 
21st January l99l
General Maurice Schmitt, Chief of the French Defence Staff and Chairman of the WEU Chiefs
of Defence Staff Committee;
Admiral Doniol. Military Counsellor to the French Government and Liaison Officer to the
WEU Assemblyl
Captain Combarieu, WEU Desk Officer in the French Ministry of Defence.
Toulon 
- 
26th February l99l
Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chie.l, Mediterranean
Vice-Admiral Merlot, Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief;
Rear Admiral Gazaneau, Head of Operations;
Captain Cluzel, CECMED staff;
Commander Gassier, CECMED staff.
The committee embarked in and was briefed by the commanding officers of the:
- 
aircraft carrier Clemenceau (Captain Fourreaux);
- 
frigate Montcalm (Captain wybo);
- 
frigate Dupleix (Captain P6zard).
The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, officials and senior
officers who met the R.apporteur or committee and replied to questions.
The opinions e)(pressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the com-
mittee.
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Draft Recommendation
on the Gulf crisis 
- 
lessons for Western European Union
The Assembly,
(i) Congratulating the WEU Council of Ministers on what has been achieved by the forces of
member nations to help the coalition resolve the crisis in the Gulf and in particular applauding the ini-
tiatives taken by the Chairman-in-Office to co-ordinate WEU activities;
(ii) Seconding the Council's prompt action in helping to provide the military support necessary to
take aid to and ensure the protection of the Kurdish refugeest
(iii) Welcoming the German decision to join current WEU mine-clearing operations in the Gulf;
(iv) Believing that a longer-term WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area would considerably
strengthen the chances of maintaining peace and stability in the region:
(v) Supporting the idea of regular meetings of WEU chiefs of defence staff;
(vil Dismayed that there is no certainty that the excellent arrangements made by the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council to co-ordinate WEU activities both in the Gulf area and between national cap-
itals, as well as in the WEU operational cells, will continue beyond the end of Junel
(vii) Convinced that the time is now ripe formally to associate Denmark, Greece, Norway and
Turkey. if they wish, with the work of WEU,
Rrcorr,rveNos rHAT rnr CouNcrr-
l. Establish, in co-operation with the United Nations and especially with the relevant Gulf states, a
WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels
Treaty with as many member countries as possible contributing assets at least on an occasional basis,
to help maintain peace and stability in the region and support diplomatic efforts directed towards the
same ends;
2. Invite the governments of Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey to be associated on a per-
manent basis with the work of WEU at all levels and in all bodies:
3. Instruct the chiefs of defence staff to meet regularly and to examine the feasibility of
co-ordinating national assets to establish WEU rapid action forces for extra-European operations;
4. Ensure the continuity, as long as may be necessary, of WEU co-ordination ofl
(a) the application of the United Nations embargo on arms, etc., for Iraq;
(b) mine-clearing operations in the Gulf;
(c/ support for aid to the Kurds and their protection,
both on the spot and between national capitals, by either transferring the total task from Paris to Bonn
with the change of Chairman-in-Office of the Council on lst July 1991, or mandating the Secretary-
General to make the necessary arrangements.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapponeur)
I. Introduction
l. This is the third report of the Defence
Committee to be dedrcated to the Gulf crisis
since it began on 2nd August 1990. The great
difference with the previous two reports r,
however, is that the immediate United Nations
aim to free Kuwait which inspired co-ordinated
action by Western European Union has been
achieved with the provisional cease-fire of 25th
February l99l and the acceptance by Iraq ofthe
conditions governing a permanent cease-fire r.
2. Your Rapporteur's first reaction is
therefore to congratulate all those countries,
members of the coalition, who through their
mutual solidarity demonstrated a resolve to
apply the guiding principles of the United
Nations Charter. The outward and visible sign
of this solidarity is represented by the men and
women who sought firstly through peaceful
means and latterly by f'eat of arms to achieve a
successful conclusion to the crisis and by all
those who supported their endeavours, both at
home and abroad. Our admiration for each indi-
vidual concerned is especially well-merited, as is
our acknowledgement of the undoubted lead-
ership qualities of the United States.
3. There has been considerable criticism of
the lack of positive European action in the face
of Iraq's blatant aggression against Kuwait and
while there is room for such criticism in the
context of the Twelve in the framework of
European political co-operation, it is definitely
without foundation where Western European
Union is concerned, as readers of the
Assembly's Documents 1243 and 1248 will be
more than aware. No formal response to the spe-
cific recommendations made in these two
reports has yet been received from the Council,
but your Rapporteur has been assured by many
a senior officer that the right questions were
asked at the right time. In addition. most of the
recommendations have actually been imple-
mented which is in itself a compliment to the
Assembly. And not only member countries have
taken note of what was discussed, as the
Chairman of the Defence Committee and your
Rapporteur discovered when they visited Wash-
ington in February.
4. Concern in the lJnited States, as well as
centring on progress in the Gulf, focused also on
l. Consequences of the lnvasron of Kuwait: operatrons in
the Guli Document 1243. and Consequences of the invasion
of Kuwart: continurng operations rn the Gulf regron, Doc-
ument 1248. Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.
2. See Appendrx I.
the future shape of European security and
defence. Fears that the United States might be
marginalised in future arrangements were very
prevalent. Our interlocutors had dusted off their
copies of the modified Brussels Treaty, discov-
ering the organic link with NATO contained in
Article IV, but were worried about moves to
create such links with the European Community
as well, risking a weakening of the Atlantic part-
nership. The American demarche before the last
WEU ministerial therefore came as no sur-
prise.
5. WEU is generally perceived as the basis
for creating the European pillar within the
Atlantic Alliance 
- 
which pleases the Americans,
provided of course that the other, European
non-WEU members of NATO, Denmark,
Greece, Norway and especially Turkey, are not
left out of the equation...
II. WEa and Denmark, Greece, Norway
and Turkey
6. Building on what was achieved between
August and December 1990, the WEU Council
of Ministers met in Paris on lTth January l99l
and again on 22nd February. The first meeting.
continuing the practice begun at the end of last
year, included observers from Denmark, Greece,
Norway and Turkey, specially invited because of
the context. This latter point is of double signifi-
cance now given the occasional criticism of
WEU as being too exclusive an organisation.
Including the four non-members, two of whom
are EC members, all of whom are NATO
members, is a pragmatic solution to the charges
of exclusivity. Interestingly enough, two of the
four have already applied formally for WEU
membership (Greece and Turkey). but the
Council, while agreeing to give special briefings
to both countries after WEU ministerial ses-
sions, has been slow to reply mainly because of
those two countries' " local difficulty " which
has the potential to stalemate the provisions of
Article V of the modrfied Brussels Treaty.
Therefore, this recent pragmatic attempt by the
Council to produce a kind of observer status for
the countries concerned is to be welcomed(although it should be emphasised that the
Assembly itself has been inviting and welcoming
observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway and
Turkey for the past five years or so!).
7 . It is hoped that the WEU Council of Min-
isters will now address itself to the particular
problem of enlargement; as far as the Assembly
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is concerned, the problem of associating non-
Community members with the work of WEU is
a non-problem and the Assembly has never
insisted on making membership of the European
Community a prior condition for membership
of WEU. The present machinations by some
who would prefer to invite neutral Ireland tojoin WEU rather than Norway or Turkey defy
common sense. The only present logical imper-
ative for admission to WEU is a commitment to
common defence through parallel membership
of the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, as the queue of
those countries wishing to be associated with the
European Community lengthens and becomes
decidedly esoteric and markedly neutral/non-
aligned at best (Austria, Sweden, Finland, Switz-
erland, maybe, let alone many of the recently-
democratic, erstwhile members of the Warsaw
Pact), it seems increasingly obvious that the
main criterion for joining WEU should be a
demonstrated il,illingness to commit oneself
wholeheartedly to the defence ideals which have
shaped European defence. viz: the Brussels and
Washington treaties, coupled with the strong
restatement of faith which rs the Hague
platform. The two countries which merit the
earliest consideration in this context are
therefore Norway and Turkey.
8. The former is still very much in the front
line when it comes to the traditional East-West
axis which has governed NATO responses for
the past forty years (a front line where the
potentially-opposing elements have never ceased
to grow and be reinforced, in spite of fine words
and a shining-bright, if as yet unratified, Treaty
on Conventional Forces in Europe).
9. The latter country has proved its resolve
as a front-line state both in East-West terms, but
more importantly now in the North-South orien-
tation and is deserving of more recognition
and consideration than has sometimes been
apparent. Recent mutterings in the ranks ques-
tioning the relevance of Article V of the Wash-
ington Treaty should Turkey have been attacked
by Iraq are symptomatic of a particular insensi-
tivity.
10. Of course your Rapporteur realises that
the question of enlargement is only part of the
current debate on the future shape of European
security and both the Presidential and Political
Committees are addressing the issues, but the
Gulf crisis has served to concentrate minds and
also to emphasise the growing links between
WEU and other European states - in a prag-
matic and particularly positive way.
11. The Gulf crisis has shown the mettle of
Turkey as a loyal member of the Atlantic
Alliance: Denmark, Greece and Norway have all
demonstrated common cause with the allies in
sending ships to help enforce the United
Nations embargo and in other humanitarian
ways also. The Assembly should now urge the
WEU Council to seek a way of associating all
four countries, if they wish, with the work of
WEU.
III. The Brussels and ll/ashington treaties
12. Mention of the Brussels and Washington
treaties brings to mind another myth which your
Rapporteur considers should be laid to rest.
Certain commentators, and indeed prime actors
in the negotiations currently being pursued on
European Union, have implied that the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty is due to end in 1998 which
is not true. Quite apart from the debate as to
whether the period of 50 years before a state
may give a year's notice of wishing to leave
WEU dates from the signing of the Brussels
Treaty in 1948 or from the ratification of the
modified Brussels Treaty in 1955. the whole
issue is nothing more than a red herring
designed to support the contention that WEU is
soon to be wound up and its attributes taken
over by the European Community!
13. To make an interesting parallel: did any
state announce its intention to leave the Wash-
ington Treaty when a similar opportunity arose
to quit NATO 
- 
in 1969, only twenty years after
the signing of the treaty? Even the vicissitudes
suffered by NATO in 1966 did not induce any
member nation to leave totally! Why should it
be any different for WEU in either 1998 or
2005? For completeness, the full text of the rel-
evant articles of the Brussels and Washington
treaties is given at Appendix II.
IY. Lessons from the Gulf
14. In European terms a certain number of
lessons are immediately obvious:
l. the need for more heavily-equipped,
mobile and flexible forcesl
2. Europe does not possess sufficient
land, air or especially sea transport
for this sort of strategic deployment;
3. electronic warfare capabilities must
be considerably improved;
4. missile launchers have proved to be far
more mobile than originally expected;
5. missile proliferation and increasing
ranges mean that Europe needs an
anti-ballistic missile capability;
6. Europe was confronted with risks in
the Mediterranean area which had
not been forecast and should show the
same solidarity with Mediterranean
countries as hitherto with the Federal
Republic of Germany on the Central
Front;
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7. chemical weapons were a specific
threat to the coalition forces and
much time and effort was spent in
preparing to counter them;
8. the debate concerning conscription
has been reopened in countries where
it is still practised;
9. all possible solutions regarding peace
in the Gulf and the part to be played
by WEU remain open;
10. what should be the future r6le of
WEU forces?
15. Of course there are other lessons also,
which will gradually emerge as the various
analyses of the action are carried out. The impli-
cations of the above first conclusions merit
further consideration:
I. It is generally true that rapid action
forces are likely to be more lightly-
equipped: that is why they are able
to respond quickly in an emergency.
Such deployment is usually a
deterrent in itself and if more
heavily-equipped force is required
it is a question of " holding on "
until reinforcements arrive. In the
recent conflict both United States
and French quick reaction forces,
which were first to arrive in Saudi
Arabia, were not equipped to fight a
land battle but were symbolic of a
commitment for defence. British
forces were slower to arrive, but
brought heavy armour with them.
What is required ideally is a heavy
airlift capability, which can prove
very expensive. Otherwise it is a
question of'coming by sea with the
built-in delay that entails.
2. Transport and indeed logistics gen-
erally are vital for victory. Previous
reports for the Defence Committee
have highlighted the alliance's
shortcomings and even although
certain governments now have spe-
cific procedures for taking up ships
or aircraft from civilian operators,
the situation is still fraught with dif-
ficulty. In his parallel report, on
Arms control: force reductions and
the r6le of multinational units,
Mr. Uyttendaele, Rapporteur, sug-
gests that a WEU study be carried
out for a possible joint air transport
fleet. The C-130 Hercules will need
replacing in the not too distant
future and perhaps the already
extant European Airbus (340 M)
might fit the bill? wholly-dedicated
aircraft and ships for transport in
general are not really necessary but
a specific organisation for identi-
fying what is required and keeping
track of assets is essential.
3. Electronic warfare capabilities ranging
from interpretation of Identifica-
tion Friend or Foe (IFF) challenges
through to sophisticated decoying
of missiles are increasingly impor-
tant and often more cost-effective
than shooting off anti-missile mis-
siles (this would prove a very
worthwhile subject for a future
report to the Assembly).
4. Confrontation with mobility of mis-
siles equals only one determining
factor: effective intelligence and
therefore a satellite capability. On
occasion in the Gulf conflict the
Europeans were completely blind 
-
hence the need for an early decision
to create the WEU observation sat-
ellite agency, as recommended in
the previous report on the Gulf
crisis (Document 1248, Rap-
porteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer).
5. lt is certainly correct that Europe
badly needs an anti-ballistic missile
capacity. 
.As ranges Iengthen and
accuracy increases, more and more
European territory will become
liable to attack if we are not able to
remain in the forefront of tech-
nology ourselves. The time is fast
approaching when the requirement
for observation satellites, open skies
r6gimes, etc., will become especially
pressing.
6. The balance has certainly shifted
from East-West confrontation to
North-South problems, with the
Mediterranean now forming part of
the European front line. Hence the
importance of maintaining strong
forces-in-being in the area and, for
example, altering the basis of
NATO's naval on-call force Medi-
terranean from month-long acti-
vation twice a year to a permanent
status. Hence also the need for
WEU and NATO to support pro-
posals for a confidence- and
security-building r6gime for the
Mediterranean area, as recom-
mended in the forthcoming report
on European security and threats
outside Europe, Rapporteur: Mr.
Martinez.
7. Chemical weapons in the Middle
East were already a problem during
the Iran-Iraq war. Our nations must
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redouble their efforts to achieve a
global ban on the production, pos-
session and use of such devices and
produce an effective verification
arrangement to ensure that they
remain banned. The Defence Com-
mittee will be meeting at the United
Nations Conference on Disarm-
ament in Geneva in June to con-
sider the best way of giving a def-
inite impetus to the negotiations.
8. The debate on conscription or not
is well open in the majority of WEU
countries where nationaI service
still exists. Countries such as Spain
and Italy did not take
the same stance as France (" no
national servicemen in the Gulf
area, not even on board ship " 
-
hitherto regarded as " national
soil " ). The " professionalising " of
the forces may be attractive for
some but it is doubly frustrating for
others if done on an ad hoc basis(i.e. both for those who " sign on "
and are not sent and for those who
do not sign and are then forced to
quit (their team, unit or ship). Also
affecting this debate is the asso-
ciated issue of the r6le of women in
the armed forces (see the recom-
mendations suggested by Mrs.
Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur).
9/10. The future r6le of WEU forces in
the Gulf region, in the first
instance, as discussed by ministers
recently and then by the chiefs of
defence staff at their meeting in
Paris on 10th April, is to:
(a) contribute to the continuing
selective embargo decreed by
the United Nations against Iraq;
(b) clear the vast numbers of mines
laid off Kuwait;
(c) help provide military support
for aid to the Kurds and their
protection.
In the longer term WEU forces
could play a vital rdle in helping to
keep the peace in this troubled part
of the globe. In co-operation with
the Gulf states, Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, WEU should consider
building on traditional French
(Indian Ocean) and British (Armilla
patrol) presence in the area. A
system of roulement between the
other member countries who were
willing to contribute ships would
mean that nothing would be
imposed on any one country. It is
understood by your Rapporteur that
a number of WEU member nations
are already responding positively to
this idea and proposing to make
ships avarlable, at least on an occa-
sional basis, to join such a force.
Y. Emhargo, mine-clearance
and logistic support
16. It is not generally realised by the public at
large that the United Nations embargo against
Iraq is continuing. Although food and medicines
may be made available, all war material, spare
pafis, etc., etc., are subject still to embargo.
Because of the mine problem in the Gulf itself,
commercial traffic there has almost come to a
halt. Not so however in the Bab el-Mandab
strait and at Tiran where WEU frigates are as
active as ever. Overall, more than 700/o of chal-
lenges to ships in the various areas since August
1990, have been made by the WEU ships
present (see Appendix III).
17. As detailed in the last report on the Gulf
crisis, Iraq had the potential stocks to wreak
havoc through mine-warfare. It is estimated that
some I 200 mines were laid in the general area
of sea off Kuwait and it is now a question of
clearing these mines and ensuring safety of navi-
gation in the area once again. At the time of
writing some 25 mine-clearance vessels are
working in the Gulf under WEU auspices. They
will have work for some time to come, even
though Iraq has made available its theoretical
mining plans. The particular breakthrough
which has occurred in this context is the arrival
of the German mine-clearance task group. Ini-
tially based in the Mediterranean only, in Crete,it was thought that German interpretation of
their constitution forbade any operations out of
area. Apparently not, although Bonn has been at
pains to stress the humanitarian nature of
current operations: " freedom of the sea lines of
communication ". Whatever the reasoning, this
is now a precedent which will be seized on when
the debate on taking part in United Nations
operations is initiated in Bonn. Your Rappor-
teur trusts that his colleagues will encourage the
Chairman-in-Office-designate to exploit WEU
extra-European actions to the full. WEU's r6le
in providing the military logistics for the aid dis-
patched by the European Community to help
Kurdish refugees is welcome and results from
direct contact between the European Com-
munity and the WEU Ministerial Council.
18. It is obvious that these aspects of WEU
co-operation must continue and be co-ordinated
effectively for as long as is necessary. The
present Chairman-in-Office of the WEU
Council, France, is to be congratulated for the
various initiatives taken on co-ordination both
on the spot in the Gulf, between national cap-
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itals through regular meetings of the naval and
military points of contact and by creating the
WEU operational cells to keep all concerned
fully informed.
19. At present it is not yet clear whether all
these arrangements will be transferred to Bonn
from Paris when the Presidency of WEU
changes on lst July 1991. Your Rapporteur
believes that what has now been achieved by
way of WEU co-operation must not be lightly
abandoned and he suggests that the Assembly
should now seek the Council's assurance that the
good work will continue.
20. Failing a transfer of co-ordinating compe-
tences lock, stock and barrel to Bonn, consider-
ation should be given to mandating the Secretary-
General to make the necessary arrangements for
the work to be done within his own empire (if
necessary through the secondment of appro-
priate individuals from national ministries).
21. Of course if the V/EU Permanent Councilin the future is composed of the same per-
manent representatives as are accredited to
NATO, then organisation of such considerations
may be somewhat easier. Meanwhile, the WEU
ministers should begin to rely on and use their
own chiefs of defence staff, meeting within the
WEU context.
22. In the immediate future, the Chiefs of
Defence Staff Committee should be convened
on a regular basis (and slmilar meetings of chiefs
of naval, military and air staffs also organised)
and be invited now to determine the feasibility
of establishing WEU napid action forces for
extra-European operations. Such an exercise
should of course take account of the various
vital parameters involved: overlap with NATO,
plans for multinational rapid reaction forces,
prepositioning perhaps, air and sea transport
requirements, the logistics of potential opera-
tions, command and control aspects, intelli-
gence-gathering, etc., etc. 
- 
in fact the very con-
iiderations which led to the joint specific guide-
Iines for co-ordinating actions by WEU coun-
tries to control of the embargo at sea and
previous and subsequent guidelines in other
areas also.
23. The sooner we may establish some sort of
planning arrangements for present and future
WEU action, the more prepared and capable
will we be in " expecting the unexpected ".
YI. Conclusions
24. There is little doubt that a post-mortem of
any military operation proves fascinating and
may provide pointers for the future. The day-
by-day chronology of Gulf crisis events annexed
to the two previous reports has been continued
up to the cease-fire and is available to members
as an information document. Some of the con-
clusions reached are elaborated in Appendix IV,
but your Rapporteur is sure that generations to
come will be poring over the Gulf crisis and con-
tinuing to draw their own conclusions for years
hence. As far as we are concerned in Western
European Union this is now the beginning of a
new era: the Gulf crisis has marked the way
forward and provided WEU with a reinvigo-
rated raison d'0tre.
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APPENDIX I
United Nations Security Council Resolution 686
on conditions for a permanent cease-fire
The Security Council,
Recalling and reaffirming its Resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990),662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665(1990),666 (1990),667 (1990),669 (1990),670 (1990),614 (1990), 677 (1990) and 678 (1990),
Recalling the obligations of member states under Article 25 of the Charter,
Recalling paragraph 9 of Resolution 661 (1990) regarding assistance to the Government of
Kuwait and paragraph 3 (c) of that resolution regarding supplies strictly for medical purposes and, in
humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.
Taking note of the letters of the Foreign Minister of Iraq confirming Iraq's agreement to comply
fully with all of the resolutions noted above (sl22275), and stating its intention to release prisoners of
war immediately (sl 2227 3).
Taking note of the suspension of offensive combat operations by the forces of Kuwait and the
member states co-operating with Kuwait pursuant to Resolution 678 (1990),
Bearing in mind the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions, and the objective in Reso-
lution 678 (1990) of restoring international peace and security in the region.
Underlining the importance of Iraq taking the necessary measures which would permit a defin-
itive end to the hostilities,
Affirming the commitment of all member states to the independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Iraq and Kuwait, and noting the intention expressed by the member states co-operating
under paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 678 ( 1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to
an end as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives of the resolution,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
l. Affirms that all 12 resolutions noted above continue to have full force and effectl
2. Demands that Iraq implement its acceptance of all l2 resolutions noted above and in particular
that Iraq:
(a/ Rescind immediately its actions purporting to annex Kuwait;
(b) Accept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury arising
in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the
lnvaslon and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;
(c/ Immediately release under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
Red Cross Societies, or Red Crescent Societies, all Kuwaiti and third country nationals
detained by Iraq and return the remains of any deceased Kuwaiti and third country nationals
so detained; and
(d) lmmediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, to be completed in the
shortest possible period;
3. Further demands that Iraq:
(a) Cease hostile or provocative actions by its forces against all member states including missile
attacks and flights of combat aircraftl
(b) Designate military commanders to meet with counterparts from the forces of Kuwait and the
member states co-operating with Kuwait pursuant to Resolution 678 (1990) to arrange for
the military aspects of a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible time;
(c) Arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war under the auspices of the
International Committee of the Red Cross and return the remains of any deceased personnel
of the forces of Kuwait and the member states co-operating with Kuwait pursuant to Reso-
lution 678 (1990); and
9
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(d) Provide all information and assistance in identifying Iraqi mines, booby traps and other
explosives as rvell as any chemical and biological weapons and material in Kuwait, in areas of
Iraq where forces of member states co-operating with Kuwait pursuant to Resolution 678
(1990) are present temporarily, and in the adjacent waters;
4. Recognises that during the period required for Iraq to comply with paragraphs 2 and 3 above,
the provisions of paragraph 2 of Resolution 678 (1990) remain valid;
5. Welcomes the decision of Kuwait and the member states co-operating with Kuwait pursuant to
Resolution 678 (1990) to provide access to and commence immediately the release of Iraqi prisoners of
war as required by the terms of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, under the auspices of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Crossl
6. Requests all merrLber states, as well as the United Nations, the specialised agencies and other
international organisati<>ns in the United Nations system, to take all appropriate action to co-operate
with the Government and people of Kuwait in the reconstruction of their country;
7. Decides that Iraq shall notify the Secretary-General and the Security Council when it has taken
the actions set out above;
8. Decides that in order to secure the rapid establishment of a definitive end to the hostilities, the
Security Council remains actively seized of the matter.
l0
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APPENDIX II
Modified Brussels Treaty
(signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954)
Anrrcle XII
The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon
as possible with the Belgian Government.
It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall
thereafter remain in force for fifty years.
After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the
right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of
denunciation to the Belgian Government.
The Belgian Government shall inform the Governments of the other High Contracting Parties of
the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation.
lYashington Treaty
(signed in Washington on 4th April 1949)
Anrrclr l3
After the treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year
after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America,
which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.
l1
DOCI.TMENT I268 APPENDIX III
APPENDIX III
WEU co-ordination of the United Nations emhargo against lraq and
mine-clearance operations in the Gulf
(a) WEU forces in the Middle East (situation on 19th April I99l)
DD : Destroyer
EF : Fngate/Frdgate
.{G : Supply ship/Navrre auxrhaire
.AOR : Supply ship/Pdtrolier ravrtailleur d'escadre
LST = Tank landing shrp/Grand bdtiment de ddbarquement de
chars
t2
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(b) Naval actions (reconnaissance) linked to the application
of the UN embargo (at 17th April 1991)
WEU COUNTRIES/
NATIONS UEO
ALL COI.JNTRIES/
TOWES NATIONS
Other allies/
Autres alliés
t%
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(at lTth April 1991)
Countries
Number of merchant shrps
Challenged Boarded Drverted Warnrng shots
Belsirrm 3 009
8 269
2 3t5
485
4 368
3 139
l8
2t6
9
I
204
36
0
6
0
0
3
2
0
I
0
0
I
I
France
Tr2 I
Netherlands
Snain
United Kingdom
Total WEU 2l 585 484 ll 3
United States
Other allies . .
8 779
130
595
t42
53
2
l0
I
Total allies . 8 909 737 55 ll
Overall total 30 494 r 22t 66 t4
70
60
50
40
30
20
't0
0
(c) Naval actions linked to the application ol the United Nations embargo
(d) Number of miaes desttoyed by the Group MCM/WEa/FR/BE
(since 4th March 1991)
4-5-6-7-15.16-17.18.19.20.27-28.29.30-31-l- 2- 3-11-12-13.14,15-16-17-18
Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar Apr Apr Apr Apt Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr
13
i.l-.,
t4
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(e) Principal types of mine destroyed off Kuwait
(at 18th April 1991)
Total mines destroyed: 662
Type of mine destroyed Number destroyed
Drifti 132
320
l3l
79
Moored mines
Grorrnd mines
Beached mines
Total destroyed 662
Drifti 2
325
125
Moored mines
Ground mines
Tnfal WFII/trR/RFI 452
19.797o
Ground mines
Moored mines
r5
\
- l9.94%o\
Drifting minesL
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A Mine-warfare operations in the north of the Persian Gulf(at 19th April 1991)
-aaaaaaaa'
Saudi Arabia/
Arabie Saoudite
2 MHC (FR)
3 MHC (BE)
1 AG (BE)
2 MHC (NL)
1 BBPD (FR)
MCM =
MHC:
AG
Mine-countermeasures
Mrne-hunter/Chasseur de mlne c6tier
Supply shrp/Navire auxiliarre
to arrrve/en ralliement
2 MHC + I AC (FR) (25th April/25 avrrl)
2 MHC + I AG (GE) (25th April/25 avril)I MHC (NL) (2lst April/2I avril)
Note
l6
ffiIraq/Irak
a
\\
1
(FR/BE/NL)
3 MHC
1AG
U
UK)
Ro AliOuhvrh6
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APPENDIX IV
A few figures (Desert Storm) t
(a) A few facts
The scale, speed of planning and implementation of recent Gulf operations stunned the world,
have caused the Soviets to re-examine policy and will lead to a revision of many nations' defence
spending. In the Middle East, in particu'lar, defence ministries will be looking towards quality rather
than quantity. The figures involved in the whole of the Middle East conflict are impressive.
At the peak of the land battle, the United States had more than 540 000 personnel in the Gulf
area. Other coalition forces contributed 205 000 soldiers, sailors and airmen from 33 nations.
Out of the 68 army divisions available to Saddam Hussein on l5th January, air, ground and
naval assault rendered 42 of them " cornbat ineffective ", as the expression goes. In addition, large
numbers of Iraqi soldiers were taken prisoner.
The coalition forces rapidly achieved air superiority, then air supremacy, suffering no losses in
a.ir-to-air combat. Iraqi aircraft frequently could not be brought to combat and would abandon opera-
tions rather than press home an attack.
Iraq lost 36 fixed-wing aircraft and six helicopters in combat. No figures are yet available for the
number of Iraqi aircraft destroyed in air attacks on airfields in Iraq and Kuwait. In addition, at least
137 Iraqi aircraft flew to Iran where the aircraft, including MiG-29 Fulcrum and 11-76 Candid are still
interned.
The coalition lost relatively few aircraft to the sortie rate: 116000 air sorties, including
transport, air refuelling, casevac and communications flights were flown. With the bulk of the air
assets, the United States lost 28 fixed-wing aircraft in combat and five helicopters. Non-combat
(mainly training) flying accounted for a further l0 fixed-wing aircraft and l7 helicopters.
The United Kingdom Royal Air Force, Royal Saudi Air Force, the Italian air force and the
Kuwaiti air force lost nine combat aircraft and two in training.
During Desert Storm and the ground offensive, Desert Sabre, the statistics of damage to the Iraqi
forces are impressive:
- 
3 700 out of 4 280 main battle tanks destroyed;
- 
2 400 out of 2 870 armoured fighting vehicles destroyed; and
- 
2 600 out of 3 I l0 artillery pieces destroyed.
At sea from early August until the lime of writing, the coalition forces have intercepted ships and
carried out boardings with WEU nations taking the lion's share. The coalition forces also diverted 46
merchant ships for allegedly breaking the)United Nations' sanctions by carrying Iraqi-bound cargo (see
Appendix III for further details).
Although chemical and biological weapons did not play a part in the conflict, the Iraqi forces
used SS-l Scud and Scud-derived missiles against Israel, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. A total of 8l short/
intermediate-range ballistic missiles wr3re launched from fixed and mobile sites in western and
southern Iraq, 38 of them against targels in Israel. None reached its intended target but debris from
seven Iraqi missiles caused damage, irtcluding the United States logistics complex near Dhahran.
Eleven missiles impacted harmlessly. The United States Patriot missile system intercepted 29 of the
missiles.
(b) Success from the air
There was little doubt that the coalition would win the air war. Where virtually everyone was
wrong was in the margin of victory and its consequences. The Iraqi air and missile forces were not just
overpowered, they were never able to prrevent air attacks on Iraqi targets or to significantly damage
coalition targets.
l. Drawn from the Jane's Defence Weekly articl:, After the storm (JDW,6th April l99l).
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This meant that General Schwarzkopf could hold the line on the ground while pouring a con-
tinuous stream of air attacks on Iraqi forces.
The USAF dominated the planning and execution of the attack. USAF flew 590/o of the coalition
combat sorties, operated all but a handful of the aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided muni-
tions (PGMs) autonormously, or at night; provided virtually all tanker support and the command and
control system.
By 8th November, when coalition forces were told to build up for an offensive against Iraq, both
sides were in place on the ground and the chances of an Iraqi land offensive were minimal. The air
forces did not have to provide direct air support for coalition ground forces until the ground offensive
started.
Desert Storm Phase I threw the full weight of the coalition air force against the Iraqi air
defences, the air force and its Scud missiles. There were two objectives: to open the skies for subse-
quent attacks and to prevent retaliatory attacks by Scud missiles and Su-24 Fencers, perhaps with
chemical weapons. Parallel attacks were aimed at every chemical and nuclear plant in Iraq.
Phase 2 was shorter, concentrating on the air defences around Kuwait. Phase 3 was aimed at
cutting off the forces in Kuwait. Phase 4 was close air support for the ground war. However, Phase I
was such an overwhelming success that Phases 2 and 3 moved ahead and merged.
On paper, Iraq should have done better. It had a modern, integrated air defence system in the
Soviet pattern. A protected command and control (C2) network, based on jam-resistant microwave and
ground links, controlled 300 interceptors, 600 surface-to-air missile (SAM) units and 9 000 to l0 000
anti-aircraft-artillery (AAA) pieces. Air defence radars included an early-warning chain on the frontier
and larger radars inside Iraq.
The air defence system performed a chain of functions. It could detect and track attacking alr-
craft, assign a fighter, SAM or AAA system to each target, and cue the f,rghter or SAM to the point of
engagement. Such a sl,stem provides the commander with positive control and a clear overview of the
air battle. Its weakness is rigidity. Pilots and SAM crews come to rely on the C2 system to tell them
where to look and what to shoot. The system is crippled if one or more links in the functional chain are
broken.
In Iraq, the system fell victim to the Soviet doctrine of radio-electronic combat: " Kill one third,jam one third, and the rest will collapse by itself ".
During the 1980s, USAF adopted and practised an offensive electronic combat (EC) doctrine. In
Green Flag exercises all EC assets trained together, testing tactics which would inflict the greatest pos-
sible damage on enemy air defence systems. These assets included stand-off jammers (EC-130
Compass Call) to scramble communications, escort jammers (EF-l I lA Ravens) and F-4G Wild
Weasels, operating in hunter-killer teams with F-16s.
The Iraqi air defence system was designed to provide " graceful degradation ": the system would
continue to function after many parts had been jammed or destroyed. However, its designers assumed
that some parts could not be disabled without, at least, enough time to switch to back-up facilities. The
F-ll7A Stealth Fighter, however, could disable such targets without warning.
In the early hours of l Tth January, F-l l TAs headed for Baghdad, while others closed in towards
the early-warning line and the main strike force with the support of hundreds of tankers, stayed just
beyond the detection threshold of Iraqi radar. Early-warning radars, microwave communications links
and primary control sites were hit simultaneously.
The Iraqi air defences received virtually no targeting information from the crippled C2 system.
Some units could still lind targets with their own radars, as long as they were not jammed, but the more
they used their radars, the more they were exposed to direct attack by anti-radar missiles (ARMs).
Within a few days, the surviving Iraqi SAMs could transmit for no more than 20 seconds at a time.
In air warfare theory, l8th January would have seen the coalition re-arming while the Iraqis
identified damage, patched together their back-ups and relocated SAMs.
The first night's wave of I 000 plus sorties was the start of a campaign that threw more than
2 500 sorties a day against Iraq for 43 days. Ground forces, air bases and weapons plants were hit by a
constant stream of concentrated airpower.
Many factors contributed to the high sortie rate. Night-capable strike aircraft could sustain the
campaign around the clock. Most of the aircraft types used in Desert Storm have been in service for
eight years or more, and are much more reliable and maintainable than earlier aircraft: mission capable
rates in the 600/o plus range are now standard.
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Tankers allowed aircraft from many bases and from aircraft carriers to strike throughout the
theatre. A unified C2 system made it possible to prepare a massive, detailed air tasking ordei for each
day, encompassing every combat and support sortie.
Turnround and briefing times were cut by computerised mission planning systems; the pilots
walked to their aircraft with data cartridges and loaded complex flightplans in ieconds.
. 
Training, training and more trai;ning, both before Desert Shield and in the pre-war build-up
period, was vital. Never has an air force gone into combat with so much realistic training behind ii.
Units had time to become accustomed to desert conditions before the war started. The no-rotation
policy kept this learning undiluted.
Above all, what made the sustained intensity of Desert Storm possible was the low rate of losses.
The coalition lost 38 aircraft in combat, out of 109 876 sorties flown. The loss rate was 0.35/l 000
sorties, or one-thirtieth of one per cent.
None of the losses was caused by I raqi fighters, kept on the ground by direct attacks on their air-
fields and coalition fighters. The only ef{'ective fighter control system in Iraqi airspace was provided by
United States and Saudi AWACS aircraft.
Only on the second day did the Iraqi air force fly more than half as many sorties per day as it had
done, on average, from lst to l5th Janu,ary. Around the ninth day of the war, sorties against coalition
aircraft ceased, and a day later the Iracli Air Force began to withdraw to Iran.
There were only four days on which Iraqi aircraft 
- 
including support and combat types 
- 
flew
more than 40 sorties. About half the Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft shot down (16 out of 35) were destroyed
in the first three days. Most of the rest were bounced by USAF F-l5s while attempting to escape to
Iran.
Coalition combat losses were caused by SAMs and AAA (anti-aircraft-artillery). The USAF
relied on avoidance, suppression and jarnming to protect its aircraft from larger fixed-site SAMs, and
on offensive counter-air fighters (F-l5Csr) to keep fighers off the strike aircraft. USAF aircraft went in
at around 20 000 ft (6 000 m), above the effective altitude of SA-8s, Rolands, smaller SAMs and AAA.
Since these systems are more mobile, they cannot be easily tracked or avoided. The USN and the RAF
increased their altitudes after taking losses from AAA in low-altitude operations.
There were two aspects in which ttre campaign did not proceed as planned. One was the weather,
which was the worst in l4 years, as emphasised by the French Chief of Defence Staff, General Maurice
Schmitt, when he briefed the Defence Committee in January. Low cloud hampered F-l l7A operations,
shielding targets from their IR sensors.
The other unpleasant surprise was the number of mobile Scuds. After the first hours of opera-
tions, it was claimed that all the Scud launchers had been destroyed. However, the mobile launchers
had escaped. They could emerge, fire and remask before a counter-attack could reach them.
Scud-chasing tactics based on coalition air supremacy sharply reduced launches after 27th
January. A-l0s performed armed reconnilissance of major highways leading to areas from which Scuds
could be fired at the most important targets: Dhahran, Riyadh, Haifa and Tel Aviv.
Without the Scuds, Iraq no longer had any means of influencing the war. Iraqi ground forces
were passive targets. Because lraq was embargoed and transport had become hazardous, the air cam-
paign had a simple escalatory effect. Coralition air strikes rendered replacement, repair and resupply,
virtually impossible.
The objectives of the coalition grotrnd assault were achieved with incredibly low casualty figures.It was airpower that made this imbalance of damage possible, because airpower alone could attack
every part of the Iraqi military 
- 
every one of the 500 000 troops, every factory, every ammunition
dump, and every vehicle 
- 
while putting only a few hundred coalition aircraft and their crews at risk.
(c) Lessons for Moscow
It is generally accepted in Washington that after Desert Storm, the Soviets will place greater
Research and Development (R & D) emphasis on smart weapons, stealth and counter-stealth.
Moscow may have to restore the ;military R & D budget, cut by 13.70/o only last year.
When coalition pilots flew into action on the night of l5th/16th January, their knowledge of
Saddam Hussein's largely Soviet-supplied air defence system helped pave the way to the decisive
victory.
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Soviet advisors left Iraq knowing that the coalition's insight into the performance of Iraq's
Soviet equipment was all but total.
TV shots of laser-guided bombs dropping through the ventilation shafts of Iraqi bunkers must
have provided a jolt to the Soviet High Command.
Compounding this concern was the fact that the fourth biggest army in the world was unable to
ride out the coalition's air attacks, due in no small part to the devastating impact of smart weaponry on
lines of supply and infrastructure targets.
From the coalition's point of view, this achievement is even more remarkable when. according
to intelligence sources, only 90/o of weapons dropped were smart.
The Soviet military, which had put its trust in numbers over quality, now lives with the Conven-
tional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and its premise of numerical parity in forces between East and
West.
In the light of Desert Storm, Soviet military leaders are doubtless questioning both the cost of
CFE and Moscow's abandonment of an offensive defence doctrine.
Marshal Dimitri Yazov, the Soviet Defence Minister, has called for a complete overhaul of the
nation's air defences as a result of Desert Storm.
Acknowledging the failure of Iraq's command and control network and its missile batteries to
work effectively, MarshalYazov told the Soviet Parliament: " What happened in Kuwait necessitates a
review of our attitude to the country's entire air defence system. " This admissron appears to be an
indictment of four decades of Soviet investment in radar. CrI and SAM technology.
In 1990, in its publication Sovret Military Power, the Pentagon predicted that Moscow could
take a decision to " concentrate on the less costly research phase to help produce a technologically
superior product in the next generation ".
There are several key military technologies in which the Soviets are ahead of the United States.
The Pentagon cites research into pulsed power and energy storage as two such areas. Direct military
applications of these include electrothermal guns, electromagnetic launchers, neutral particle beam
systems, a variety of lasers, charged particle beams and ultra-wide band radars.
(d) Naval forces
Although naval forces clearly played a secondary r6le to land and air units during Operation
Desert Storm, they achieved a number of combat firsts during the campaign. Included in the list are:
- 
use of the Tomahawk Land-Attack Missiles (TLAM) in combat by submarines and surface
ships;
- 
combat use of the Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM);
- 
tandem deployment of battleships for the first time since the Korean War with the USS Mis-
souri and Wisconsin;
- 
combat employment of the Pioneer remotely-piloted vehicle (RPV) from battleshipsl
- 
conduct of I-ISMC AV-8B combat missions from a Landing Helicopter Assault Ship, the
Nassau;
- 
combat use of several classes of ships including AEGIS cruisers, MCMVs and air-cushioned
landing craft, as well as first employment of two squadrons of maritime pre-positioning ships.
Six aircraft carriers detailed to the Gulf and the Red Sea provided highly mobile platforms from
which scores of tactical combat aircraft were launched. Around l8 000 United States marines in 31
amphibious ships in the northern Gulf were a critical tool in convincing Saddam Hussein that invasion
would come from the sea.
The two most striking lessons for smaller navies are that anti-air warfare and naval air superi-
ority are crucial; and that naval mining is the most cost-effective alternative available to harass and
delay the operations of a larger naval force.
Analysts in the United Kingdom have pointed out the value of helicopter-borne anti-ship
weapons such as BAE Dynamics' Sea Skua, used by RN Lynx helicopters to attack and sink several
Iraqi vessels. However, with virtually unchallenged naval air supremacy. the coalition's naval tech-
nology may not have been fully tested.
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United States carner-based naval aviation clearly played a dominant r6le. In close co-operation
with land-based fighter aircraft and E-3 AWACS airborne command and control aircraft, the naval
forces in the Gulf set up a watertight, layered air defence system, covering the naval units as well as
providing a defensive buffer zone on the eastern flank of the Gulf.
Carrier-based E-2C Hawkeyes provided additional airborne early-warning (AEW) with carrier-
based fighters mounting combat air patrols as well as surface combat air patrols.
USN strike aircraft flew 23o/o of combat missions, in direct proportion to their numbers in the
total theatre inventory. Navy and USNIC forces had flown 28 929 sorties by 6th March, of which
approximately 360/o were strike missions and 300/o were fleet/defence and combat air patrol.
However, with seven navy and eight USMC aircraft lost, one of the early lessons of the war was
that aircraft had to remain at high altitudes out of range of the more than27 500Iraqi AAA sites.
The navy is still studying the overall success of its weapons in hitting their targets. There was an
estimated 850/o success rate for the 291 TLAMs launched. At least two were shot down.
In the first combat employment of the SLAM, four out of seven missiles fired during the cam-
paign hit their target. Like the USAF, the navy feels one of the most significant lessons learned was the
value of precision-guided munitions.
The navy may reconsider its on-board electronic identification (ID) methods. United States rules
of engagement called for aircraft to make two electronic forms of ID before shooting an air-to-air
missile, to ensure that no friendly aircraft would be hit.
Navy aircraft, however, only fly u,ith a single electronic ID method, and have to rely on visual
ID or a signal from another friendly aircraft for a second method of identification. So during the
ground campaign, the navy had to co-o,rdinate with ground forces when firing Harm missiles. This
ensured Harm would not home in on fi-iendly emitters.
(e) Mine-sweeping operations
Although the Iraqis laid a broad variety of mines along the Kuwaiti and Iraqi coastlines, mine-
clearing and sweeping was not a top tactical priority until after coalition victory.
One clear lesson for the United States as well as other nations facing regional conflicts, is the
extent to which mine-countermeasure programmes must be adequately funded.
The United States Central Command decided to avoid mine-strewn waters by engaging in a land
campaign instead of a direct amphibiours assault by the marine corps.
Centcom was prepared to undertalce a sea-based approach to Kuwait if the land campaign alone
was not sufficient. However, as it was successful, the coalition will never know how successful it could
have been in clearing a path through the mines.
Among the mines found by coalition forces were shallow water mines, such as the Soviet-based
but indigenously-produced Al Muthena-3i5 and -45 mines (the numerical denotes kg), which could have
been used in the surf against USMC anrphibious landing craft.
In deeper water, the indigenous 400 kg warhead Sigeel moored mine was deployed as an outer
barrier by the Iraqis. Even more dangerous were the Manta influence bottom mines, a few of which
have been found.
An Iraqi moored mine with a 100 kg warhead was also discovered for the first time. In recent
weeks, a second version, a 145-kg elliptically-shaped mine, has been found in great numbers. Several
dozen mines were found floating further south after breaking mooring cables.
Before the post-war mine-clearrng campaign started, many mines detected by coalition navies
had floated south.
These were discovered bl patrolling aircraft and by visual sightings from vessels. Destruction
was primarily carried out by divers with explosives, as well as by machine guns mounted on the decks
of naval vessels.
In the early stages of Operation Desert Shield, United States forces deployed three 1950s-era
Aggressive-class ocean mine-sweepers and the new Avenger mine-countermeasures vessel to the Gulf.
The Avenger has reportedly experienced major mechanical problems which have kept it under
repairs for at least half its time on task in the Gulf. Also deployed were six MH-53E Sea Dragon heavy
mine-sweeping helicopters.
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Early in the air campaign, coalition forces focused for over a week on destroying Iraq's navy. In
this series of air attacks, most of Iraq's mineJaying capability was destroyed, including Soviet-made
T-43 ocean mine-sweepers, a host of smaller mineJaying vessels, amphibious landing craft and hover-
craft.
Ironically, with the war now over, mines are finally emerging as one of the central threats in the
region 
- 
especially to shipping.
As mentioned above, a large-scale WEU mine-disposal effort is underway with mine-
countermeasures (MCM) assets from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, the Nether-
lands and Italy. The disposal effort is expected to take months, although lone mines will be found for
years to come (as witness the fact that one mine destroyed was laid by the British in the 1940s).
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